Privatizations in developing countries that don't embrace a governance perspective will disappoint. This paper introduces the concept of 'governance chains' that can constrain the 'grabbing hands' of public and private actors by providing information and accountability mechanisms for investors. Recently available empirical data from established firms from 49 countries around the world provides estimates of the relative importance and strength of 'private' and 'formal' governance chains. The framework and empirical benchmarks help to explain past privatization outcomes and suggest steps to be taken to get the most out of future privatization activity. This paper argues that policy makers need to consider more than issues of competition and regulation to get the most out of privatization. Policy makers that adopt a corporate governance perspective will have more effective privatizations with fewer problems, particularly in the long-term. The steps required to bring together those with resources to invest and managers with strong investment projects that they can implement in privatized firms are deceptively simple; give management free hands to pursue strong investment projects but constrain 'grabbing hands' of public and private parties by providing information and accountability to investors. I say deceptively, because it is difficult to put such ideas into practice because of the variety of institutions that affect information and accountability.
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Privatization programs have dominated public policy debates and transformed the economic landscape. Over the last 15 years close to $1 trillion in assets have been passed from the government to private hands.
1 Billions more in assets await future privatizations.
This shift of responsibility from the state to private hands has clear benefits.
Analysts of privatization report macroeconomic and political benefits ranging from increased state revenue to a reduction in the states' role in provision of goods and services, while academic research has documented significant operating and performance improvements. 2 As Shleifer (1998) notes, such evidence has moved thinking away from qualified acceptance of privatization, with concerns about the extent of market failure, towards enthusiastic endorsement of the transfer of assets from the 'grabbing hands' of the state into private hands.
More recent evidence challenges this view. Transfers of assets from the state to private hands have not stopped 'grabbing hands' of the state. More importantly, there is evidence of new 'grabbing hands' of insiders in privatized firms. Examples abound.
In Chile, the managers of the largest privatized electricity company pocketed more than 850 times the price given to minority shareholders in a takeover bid. 3 In Russia, following privatization of Yukos Oil, the controlling shareholder "skimmed over 30 cents per dollar of revenue, while stiffing his workers on wages, defaulting on tax payments by claiming that Yukos couldn't afford them, destroying the value of minority shares in both Yukos and the production companies that Yukos controlled but only partly owned, and not reinvesting in Russia's run-down oil fields, which badly needed new investment." 4 In the Czech republic firms were 'tunneled out,' left with debts, disenchanted workers and investors, and great difficulty in raising capital to fund future investment projects. As one foreign investor trumpeted in a full page ad in the New York 1 Data based on the value in constant 1999 dollars of sales of government assets tracked by Security Data Company from 1984-1999. 2 Evidence about the benefits of privatization comes from a variety of sources including detailed case studies (e.g. Galal et al. (1994) ), in-depth studies of particular countries (e.g. LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999)), cross-country studies of privatizations in developed and developing countries (Megginson et al. (1994) , D'Souza and Megginson (1999) , Boubakri and Cosset (1998) ) and numerous other studies detailed in comprehensive surveys (e.g. Megginson and Netter (1999) , Nellis (1998) , and Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) ). 3 Wright (1999) . 4 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (1999) .
Times, "think twice before you invest in the Czech Republic. Otherwise, you could be left to 'twist in the wind. '" 5 These privatization disappointments present challenges for those considering privatization in developing countries. A starting point for much advice has been overthrown. Evidently, the transfer of title in privatization is insufficient to ensure improved resource allocation. But no new starting point is offered.
This paper argues that policy makers need to consider more than issues of competition and regulation to get the most out of privatization. Policy makers that adopt a corporate governance perspective will have more effective privatizations with fewer problems, particularly in the long-term. The steps required to bring together those with resources to invest and managers with strong investment projects that they can implement in privatized firms are deceptively simple; give management free hands to pursue strong investment projects but constrain 'grabbing hands' of public and private parties by providing information and accountability to investors. I say deceptively, because it is difficult to put such ideas into practice because of the variety of institutions that affect information and accountability.
To simplify thinking about privatization and governance I introduce the concept of governance chains that can constrain grabbing hands and provide benchmarks as to the use of different governance chains in established firms. I distinguish two types of chains, the first being a private governance chain where there are few institutions and each provides both information and accountability. The second governance chain I call formal, and the specialization of information and accountability increases the length of the chain and the demand for institutional depth. The framework and evidence from established firms helps to interpret past privatization evidence, and offers insight into how to make future privatizations as effective as possible.
1 Sizing Up the Corporate Governance Challenge
Investment in exchange for a promise
In a well-functioning economy there is specialization in investment and management. Investors delegate decision making over investments to those with the information necessary to make the right business decisions. Resources are matched with those with good investment projects and the ability to implement. Suppliers, workers, managers, and financiers are all investors of a sort as they entrust their resources to those in control of an enterprise. Each, as an investor in a long-lived collective enterprise, awaits promised returns to these contributions.
The promise investors receive in exchange for their resources includes specific terms and broader understandings about how future contingencies will be resolved.
There are always doubts with a promise. The parties to the promise, as distinct entities with their own goals, know their interests are not perfectly aligned. The promise is certainly incomplete, as it is difficult if not impossible to identify in advance all of the possible complex changes in circumstances. The greater the time between the making of the promise and its payment, the greater the likely concerns about complexity and consequently the greater the concerns that the original terms of the promise will not be fulfilled.
Grabbing hands undermine promises and produce social costs
A major obstacle to securing such investments is the prospect that those delegated with decision-making power will not use that power as they promised. The fear is one of 'grabbing hands' diverting returns rather than helping hands delivering what was promised. Some diversions are obvious, such as outright theft. Others are less obvious but equally costly from a societal perspective such as the continuation of investments that reward those in control.
Where there are no ways to credibly constrain grabbing hands from diverting resources, suppliers, workers, managers and financiers will not extend resources to firms.
Countries lose two ways in the long run. Valuable investment opportunities are simply lost. As important, there is no competition for control of resources within firms leaving poorly managed firms to underperform, and it is more difficult for new firms to raise capital and punish these poorly performing firms in the product market.
Grabbing hands can be both public and private. Public grabbing hands include government officials who require 'extralegal payments' or diversion of firm assets in exchange for services and licenses such as the continued ability to operate. The acknowledged problems with public grabbing hands provides an important rationale for privatization. Where public grabbing hands are unconstrained, economic activity goes underground and out of the formal economy.
Less widely acknowledged are the problems of private grabbing hands that may surface in privatized firms where insiders divert resources from outsiders. For privatization to be effective it has to do more than tie public grabbing hands; it has to tie the grabbing hands of private actors in the privatized firms.
It is helpful to distinguish two types of private grabbing hands. First, there is the situation where the insiders are management and the outsiders are the providers of finance. Viewed from a traditional US perspective, managers often effectively have control over firm resources with no ownership stake and little oversight due to the dispersion of ownership and the free-rider problem that limits monitoring of management. There are myriad ways aside from outright theft that managers can reward themselves at the expense of investors. These include the transfer of investor resources at non-market prices to themselves, misallocation of investor resources to build empires, or simply management slack.
Second, there is the situation where the insiders are the controlling shareholders and the outsiders are those investors who lack control. The vulnerability of outsiders such as minority shareholders has been raised more forcefully in the continental European countries (e.g. Becht and Roell (1999) ) and developing countries where concentrated owners are more common. An owner with control over the firm, but not a 100 percent stake, might see his interests best served by arranging transactions with another firm where he owns a larger stake. Both sales of assets at below value to the private company or the purchase of assets from the private company at inflated prices improve the situation of the controlling financier while harming the interests of other financiers.
Governance institutions constrain grabbing hands by improving information and accountability
Most simply, the institutions of corporate governance are those socially defined factors that influence the expected returns to investing and giving control to delegated decision makers. Governance institutions alter the payoffs to strategies of insiders and outsiders and consequently the actions that will be observed. 
Governance chains
Recognizing that effective governance requires constraining both private and public grabbing hands calls for a broad characterization of corporate governance institutions. generates both information and accountability. The strength of these governance chains rests largely on the motivations and ability of those in charge of these external organizations.
The most formal solutions have many more links in their governance chains.
Separate entities specialize in providing information and accountability, in addition to those that combine provision of these tasks. The three principal links are legal institutions such as laws of incorporation that hold political actors accountable, internal institutions devised by insiders and outsiders to provide both information and accountability such as the board of directors, and legal institutions like corporate and disclosure laws that ensure that information and powers of accountability are held not only by the board, but by minority outside investors more generally.
An important point of this paper is that policy advisors also need to consider the three links in the center of table 1: financial intermediaries that pool the capital of investors and provide monitoring; information intermediaries like auditing firms, credit and bond rating agencies, and brokerage firms which increase information flows and reduce the 'lemons' problem; and, regulatory organizations that provide incentives for financial and information intermediaries to provide socially beneficial information and accountability. But for our purposes, it is useful to see them as separate.
Motivation for an evaluation of both private and formal governance chains is provided in Figure 1 . On the vertical axis I have plotted each country's per capita GDP. 2 Two Governance Approaches and the Keys to their Effectiveness
Private Governance Chains
Thinking through the main components of governance chains helps an advisor to recommend a governance approach in privatization and helps to make a given approach as strong as possible. We begin by examining how promises are made credible in settings without an effective state -the situation facing many countries on the left hand side of Figure 1 .
Self-enforcement of promises is important where there is no effective state, and reputation is central to self-enforcement. One way investors can increase the security of their investments is by repeatedly interacting with the same party and allowing 'the long shadow of the future' to discipline against grabbing hands. Insiders will maintain their promises so long as the discounted losses from losing the continued relationship exceed the short-term gains associated with the breach of promise.
Link #1 -Linking insiders to an 'ordering agent'
One key to the successful use of private governance chains has been the identification of insiders with an 'ordering agent' who can coordinate and improve information flows and can coordinate penalties in case of abuse. Basically, reputation is a powerful force, but there are limits when only insiders and investors are involved.
Insiders in the firm might violate the interests of one financier and lose the ability to appeal to him again for finance, but this threat is a weak deterrent if the insider can freely access finance from other financiers. Examples where ordering agents are utilized to magnify reputation systems and support investment are found across the developing world as well as in the past history of the developed world in business associations, business groups and foreign firms. Greif (1997) (Perotti and Gelfer (1998) ) and to raise trade credit, a form of unsecured lending which is particularly important for smaller firms and firms seeking to expand their scope (McMillan and Woodruff(1998) , ).
A related way to link insiders with an ordering agent is to conduct investments through a business group, often organized around ethnic or family lines. Investors have multiple channels for collecting information and imposing penalties, with social channels supplementing financial ones. Khanna (2000) , among others, describes the widespread use of family-centered and ethnic-based business groups in the developing world and demonstrates that performance of group firms relative to non-group firms can be quite strong.
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Both historically and today, the link between foreign insiders and institutions of organized order in their home countries, can give them more credibility with investors.
Greif (1997) describes how Jewish traders had advantages in medieval Mediterranean trade due to their ethnic ties and the ability of the community to impose sanctions.
Today, foreign firms that operate in developing countries are often linked to stock exchanges in their home country, providing a link to a well functioning institution of organized order. Through this link investors know that information will be made available, as firms are required to report consolidated returns with standard accounting practices. The value of this link is suggested by the benefits domestic firms have had in improving their credibility and ability to raise finance following the cross listing on a foreign exchange.
Link #2 -Adjusting ownership and control to facilitate private information flows and enforcement
Another key to effective use of private governance chains to constrain grabbing hands is to use the ownership and control structures to engage private actors with a comparative advantage in information collection and in providing accountability.
Ownership concentration increases the incentives to monitor insiders and the ability to hold insiders accountable. With sufficiently concentrated provision of finance one set of private grabbing hands can even be eliminated, as the dominant provider of finance becomes the manager. International evidence from large firms around the world shows widespread use of this mechanism. When a family controls a firm, it participates in management more than two thirds of the time.
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Through ownership structure one can also leverage actors with access to specialized knowledge about the firm and with a comparative advantage in holding managers accountable. Up through the early 1990s, many analysts of German and Japanese corporate governance systems suggested that a key to the relatively strong performance of firms in these countries has been the ownership and control structure that involved knowledgeable and powerful banks and workers in addition to concentrated owners. Aoki (1984) underscores how labor might be able to police against abuse due to its ability to withhold its services. Financial institutions' hold-up power derives from their ability to provide long-term finance, but more importantly from their access to private information about companies as well as their ability to cut off the supply of shortterm capital.
A board is accurately characterized as a 'relational board' when it includes representatives of suppliers, workers, banks, and major customers. Board members have ties beyond their investment stake that give them preferential access to information, and an independent ability to hold insiders to account without having to resort to any legal mechanisms. This type of board is distinguished from the independent board found in more formal approaches to governance and discussed below.
Evidence of widespread use of private governance chains
How widespread are private governance chains, as evidenced by the use of ownership concentration and control? While much academic discussion focuses on dispersed ownership and supporting institutions, recent evidence from academics and World Bank researchers that have measured the size of ownership and voting stakes in large firms shows that internationally such ownership structures are the exception rather than the norm. 
Opportunity cost of private governance chains
Private solutions to governance are widespread and they can produce information and accountability. They should be given serious consideration in the design of privatization. But this consideration needs to be conducted in light of the costs of this approach relative to alternatives. In comparison with the ideal formal approach with six strong links in the governance chain, such private solutions have significant costs.
management participation 69 percent of the time in their sample while Claessens et al report 67 percent for their sample from East Asia. 8 Other studies such as LLSV (1998b) and Claessens et. al (1999a) provide measures of whether firms have a controlling shareholder. Such data is not available for the full set of 49 countries examined here.
The principal advantage of well-functioning formal approaches is one of maximizing the likelihood of linking those with resources to invest to those with the ideas and ability to implement good investment projects. In contrast, potential investment projects that would yield positive returns go unfunded in private solutions by requiring concentrated ownership or that insiders be linked to a private organization such as a group or a business association that can provide order. 9 A related benefit of formal governance chains is one of equal treatment of those with good investment projects. In private solutions those who cannot link themselves in a private governance chain legitimately feel discriminated against, being unable to fund equally good projects.
A second advantage of a well-functioning formal approach is its flexibility.
Accountability does not rest on one or two actors, but is provided by many parties. If insiders don't fulfill promises to creditors, bankruptcy laws give financiers control rights.
If insiders fail to meet expectations, they can be replaced through actions of the board backed by company by-laws, through actions of minority shareholders backed by corporate laws, or through new investors seizing control over the firm through the market for corporate control.
In contrast, with the limited number of actors involved in private governance chains, incentive problems in any one of these actors can produce real and prolonged costs. Banks that have poor incentives will be poor monitors. Recent literature on the Japanese and German systems now sees bank affiliation as costly, with bank involvement leading to overlending and deferred restructuring (e.g. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) ). In light of the Asian crisis, attention has focused on the widespread practice of control without ownership that facilitated private grabbing when the economic situation deteriorated. Moreover, the private order organizations can also coordinate business activity on goals not aligned with social welfare by fixing prices or limiting entry to the market.
At any rate, the evidence is mounting of the benefits of well-functioning governance chains. LLSV (2000) report that firms in countries with stronger legal protections are more likely to disgorge earnings through dividends; LLSV (1999b) and Claessens Djankov and Lang (1999b) show that legal protections enhance the value of shares. Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) show that countries in Asia with stronger formal mechanisms suffered smaller declines in share prices and currency values than countries with weaker protections. LLSV (1998) provide evidence that the extent of legal protections for financiers is correlated with the depth of equity markets, a predictor of future growth and development.
Formal governance chains
Relative to ideal formal governance chains, private governance chains are weaker.
But is this the right comparison? To determine if formal governance chains can be used instead we need to understand how formal governance chains function and whether they exist or can be introduced at the time of privatization. This section describes and provides some estimates of each of the six links in formal governance chains.
Link #1 -Legal institutions to constrain the grabbing hands of the state
The first link in the formal governance chain is property rights. Following the terminology of this paper, the problem is to tie the potential 'grabbing hands' of the state.
The transition economies provide striking evidence of the dangers of an unconstrained state. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2000) , in a careful study of firms across four transition economies, report that not only do those in control of an enterprise find it nearly impossible to raise external finance without constraints on the state, they are unwilling to even reinvest earnings. Reinvestment rates are 64 percent higher in firms where property rights are perceived strong compared to where they are perceived weak.
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Constraining the state is a necessary step in providing governance and allowing the matching of investment funds with good projects. 
Link # 2 -Independent boards to constrain insiders
The second link in the chain of formal governance is internal institutions designed by sophisticated insiders and outsiders to facilitate delegated decision making and constrain grabbing private hands. Here attention has focused on the institution of the board of directors, that body defined in company by-laws and appointed by shareholders to exercise control over insiders between shareholder meetings. Creating a board of directors helps to address the free-rider problem associated with monitoring by all shareholders by creating individuals with the specific task of monitoring management.
When boards include members with expertise about the firm and industry, the boardis well-positioned to solve the lemons problem arising from the withholding of poor information. The board of directors is also well positioned to provide accountability, being responsible for executive recruitment, for setting compensation policy and having rights over dismissal.
Boards are important governance agents, but they are not enough. For a board to operate effectively in improving information flows and accountability to shareholders it has to have the right incentives. All too often boards have become instruments of the manager or controlling shareholder rather than the watchdog for outside investors. The prime mechanism to improve the functioning of boards have been steps to make board members independent of top management. Building on research on board composition in 
Link #3 -Legal institutions that constrain the grabbing hands of insiders
On the information side, emphasis is placed on disclosure laws that require firms to disclose financial and ownership information in channels available to all investors.
Experience has revealed common practices through which insiders have been able to divert large proportions of firm assets to their own uses, as well as the information that, if Note that the logic behind focusing on such accountability mechanisms produced by the state is the same that drove the discussion of private 'ordering agents.' The state should be viewed as a particularly capable ordering agent as its control over coercive force gives it the ability to enforce its judgements and in principle it is non-discriminatory and open to use by all parties in an investment transaction.
LLSV first measure legal protections for providers of debt finance. In almost all developing countries debt finance is central to funding investment projects that exceed internally generated cash flow. Bankruptcy laws specify criteria for determining when promises have not been kept and a procedure for reallocating control over the use of assets and the distribution of assets, normally focusing control temporarily on a judge who often transfers it to a trustee controlled by creditors. With strong protections, there are low costs of invoking these protections and a speedy and predictable bargaining process to realize a new distribution.
LLSV next measure protections for minority shareholders written into corporate laws that uphold the corporate charter, define the process for determining the boards of directors, and define both the management's duty to the board and the board's duty to shareholders. They focus on six anti-director rights to indicate who holds power in firms:
the right to vote by proxy through the mail, shares are not blocked before meetings, the use of cumulative voting, the presence of oppressed minority rights, the existence of a preemptive right to new issues for existing shareholders, and a low threshold to call an extraordinary meeting. In addition to shareholder meetings, extraordinary actions hinge on such protections such as class-action lawsuits and takeovers.
Protections extend beyond these explicitly specified in the law. As an illustration, the legal concept of a directors' 'duty of loyalty' to investors is a phrase common in most corporate laws. This phrase is argued to have a greater impact in countries with a common-law legal tradition such as the UK, US and Commonwealth countries. Using this weakly defined 'duty' as a rationale, outsiders have been able to enlist judges as another force to protect investors from abuse by insiders. In contrast, the same 'duty of loyalty' concept is interpreted narrowly in civil law jurisdictions, with judges unwilling to involve themselves in transactions that might have a plausible business purpose, permitting more behavior often labeled as tunneling.
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Links 4-6 -Institutions that complement 'formal' governance institutions
Laws and boards are the most obvious links in formal governance chains. A critical point of this paper is to highlight additional and neglected links in the chain that 13 See Johnson, LaPorta. Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) .
are equally important to evaluate in deciding whether grabbing hands in privatized firms are best dealt with through private or formal approaches.
Organizations that improve information flows directly
The fourth link in the formal governance chain is financial organizations that pool capital and invest on behalf of clients provide. The size of the investments made by intermediaries gives them the incentive to monitor directly and/or to pay for the information collected by information intermediaries. Examples of such institutional investors include hedge funds, venture capitalists, pension and insurance funds.
Prominent in the developed world, such institutions are increasingly important in developing countries due to cross border private capital flows, as well as the growth of domestic private pension funds.
The fifth link is provided by firms that improve the flows of information to outside investors and increase investor's belief in its quality by certifying as to its quality.
Notable information intermediaries include auditing firms, credit rating agencies, bond rating firms and equity analysts in brokerage houses. These organizations can reduce the 'lemons problem' in information supply, in effect producing a public good.
US history is illustrative of the importance of such information intermediaries to investors. Intertwined with the rise of trade credit for American retailers in the 19 th century was the development of credit rating agencies followed by accounting and auditing firms. 14 Similarly, organizations that provided information on assets and those with liens on the assets, such as property registries, helped to facilitate credit and the use of collateral. The rapid expansion of railways, and the demands for external finance through bond offerings, increased demands for public accounting and encouraged the development of bond ratings companies. In equity markets, stock markets introduced listing requirements and brokerage houses and the security analysts they employed, provided analysis of current and future prospects of firms.
Organizations that provide intermediaries with incentives
14 See Rowena Olegario (2000) .
The sixth link in formal governance chains is provided by private and public regulatory organizations. Financial and information intermediaries are private firms naturally more interested in profits than in producing public goods. Financial intermediaries, for example could benefit themselves by insider trading. Information intermediaries might pursue the low cost route of not collecting information, or they could also withhold information if their profits derive more from other business relationships with the firms they monitor.
A powerful incentive for these intermediaries to provide quality information is fear of a loss of business if they fail to provide a good service. But history from developed markets such as the US suggests that reputation is not enough. Unregulated private entities in the 19 th century gave way to increasing regulatory intervention to structure incentives for these private information intermediaries by setting standards and providing discipline. In this way, regulatory authorities have effectively substituted for boards or corporate laws in promoting socially beneficial information flows.
A key element of structuring intermediaries' incentives is finding the right mix between private and state regulatory solutions. An example of a successful marriage between public powers and private is the formation of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the 1930s. Reflecting the importance of financial and information intermediaries, McCraw (1982) recounts how the architects decided to focus on these intermediaries rather than the firms issuing securities themselves. McCraw also emphasizes, that an important component of the success of this approach in increasing confidence in equity markets was both the SEC's ultimate responsibility for standard setting and discipline and the effective use of self-regulation, by delegating power to private regulatory bodies. Importantly, these third parties were not subject to the legal due process required if public agencies attempted to institute the same rules.
The appropriate mix between state and private regulation can't be specified in advance and differs to reflect industry conditions, the incentives of state regulatory actors, the desire for a more flexible system, as well as the power of reputation penalties.
For example, where reputations have less value such as is the case with new firms entering these markets in developing economies, more active state involvement might be called for until private solutions can operate effectively. But in all countries for formal governance chains to operate effectively there needs to be information intermediaries, financial intermediaries, and regulatory organizations to structure their incentives. With well structured incentives, these groups can become major promoters of improvements in other elements of formal governance chains. Where these intermediaries incentives are weak, they can become major obstacles to any governance reforms.
Private or formal governance chains?
I have gone to some length to introduce the concept of governance chains and to describe the various links and what contributes to their strength. As is clear from this discussion, information and accountability can be provided through shorter private governance chains or through longer governance chains where information and accountability are provided by separate entities. Compared to ideal formal governance chains, private governance chains are lacking. But recognizing the multiple links in formal governance chains, and that the chain may only be as strong as its weakest link, makes it impossible to say that one approach is universally preferred to the other.
Evidence on Governance Chains in Privatization
Privatization evidence provides further insight into governance approaches in privatization and their comparative merits. To what extent have privatized firms relied on formal governance chains to provide governance? Have privatization approaches that demand formal governance chains to be successful produced strong results in countries that start with weak links? In other words, can the artificial corporate structures created through privatization stimulate the development of governance institutions?
To address these questions we first focus on evidence from transition economies that provide a rich data source with country wide differences on the use of private or formal governance chains, and within-country variation. Both sources of data help us to refine our understanding of the components of effective governance. We then turn to worldwide data on privatization approaches. privatization. This is a crude measure but it captures cross country differences.
Governance approaches and privatization outcomes in transition countries
As above, the index of effective legal protections is the product of a national score for formal protections for creditors and equity investors and a measure of the rule of law. Both estimates are taken from Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) Second note that there are significant cross-country differences. A number of countries started with private governance chains in focusing on direct sales. These countries followed the patterns of Figure 2 . In Estonia vouchers were used, but in most instances 60 percent was sold to a strategic investor. 15 German officials rejected demands for a widespread distribution of shares to eastern Germans and share issues, instead using asset sales with openness to foreigners and a preference for firms that had established experience in the sector and management capabilities.
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Approaches and performance
What is the evidence of the performance of these different approaches? Data on national level performance is suggestive but because of other factors in determining national performance is not conclusive. To a large (and perhaps surprising) degree the initial approach to privatization correlates well with the country's subsequent growth experience. In figure 3 I have indicated by an asterisk countries that have per capita GDP growth rates from 1991-1998 that exceeded the average for those in the same region.
17
Those that held to international benchmarks and introduced concentrated ownership structures to reflect the weak legal environments have done better than average in their regions. Those countries that implicitly relied initially on formal governance chains, such as the Czech republic, have done worse, sometimes spectacularly worse.
More convincing than this macroeconomic evidence are the results from firm level studies. A recent survey of 3,000 enterprises completed by the World Bank and the EBRD reported in EBRD (1999) reports that for all indicators of restructuring -from reducing workforce, to new products and technology, to sales and employment increases -reform is much greater in firms that leverage concentration (less than 3 shareholder) and in firms that employ owners with links to ordering agents (foreign firms).
The most convincing findings come from quantitative empirical research that employs statistical controls for country factors and the choice of privatization method. Djankov and Murrell (2000) summarize the results from 23 studies, including notable examples such as Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) . Privatized firms that relied on formal approaches to provide governance have seen the weakest returns while those that utilized private solutions of ownership concentration and links between insiders and private 'ordering agents' have had much stronger returns. They estimate that relative to foreign ownership, the most effective structure, disperse ownership structures deliver just one tenth the impact on performance. Outsiders are more effective than insiders in improving performance. As an illustration of one of these studies, Djankov (1999) studied CIS countries and found that for privatization to have a positive impact, the ownership stake needed to be greater than 30 percent and the owner had to be a foreigner. From a governance perspective these firms benefit from private governance chains of concentrated ownership and links to an ordering agent.
Interpreting the relative weakness of formal governance chains
One problem with the initial use of formal governance chains where private governance chains could work more effectively has been the costs associated with a rapid increase in concentration and switch in governance mechanisms (and moving up in the Figure) . What was observed was a 'dash for control' but rarely did the purchasers seek to immediately assemble significant cash flow stakes. Control was sufficient to divert returns which lowered the value of the shares of minority shareholders facilitating buying more shares over time. 18 The result was that governance in firms rested for a long time on the weak links in formal governance chains.
Which links have mattered and therefore should be the focus of reform efforts in subsequent privatizations? Many of the diversionary activities introduced in eastern European firms have been perfectly legal. This suggests the importance of corporate laws, the third link in formal governance chains. However, recent research suggests that formal corporate laws, while important, should not be the sole focus. Pistor, Raiser and
Gelfer (2000) report that throughout the 1992-1998 period there was dramatic improvement in the laws on the books to protect insiders, the third link in our governance chain. The average level of legal protections for financiers in LLSV sample of 49 countries was 5.3. In 1992, the transition economies score of 3.6 put them below this level, but by 1998 their score was 6.4, and for the countries that pursued voucher privatization, the score reached 6.9.
Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) identify as the principal problem not the laws themselves, but rather that the weak link was in constraints on the state with a lack of enforcement of existing laws. The low levels of rule of law have constrained the effectiveness of all reforms.
The observation of the legality of many diversionary activities has led other researchers to focus on the links of intermediaries and the regulators that structure their incentives. Compelling evidence is provided by detailed case studies of the Czech Republic and Poland that had similar levels of legal protections but different performance. 19 The differences in performance are attributed to correspondingly weaker incentives for intermediaries in the Czech republic.
The Czech government consciously focused on formal governance chains to constrain insiders. Firms were privatized with disperse ownership relying on newly created financial intermediaries to produce information and accountability. There were no active steps to structure their incentives through the development of private or public regulatory authorities. Early studies reported that the market was working towards improving governance with few difficulties. But evidence began to surface that the laissez faire approach created ample opportunities for abuse that was left unchecked due to weaknesses in the supporting organizations that dominate the center of Table 1 . The term 'tunneling' was crafted to describe the various mechanisms through which enterprise managers and/or fund managers were able to shift investor assets to themselves.
A lack of positive incentives for intermediaries and banks facilitated tunneling.
The investment privatization funds that were the dominant intermediaries had only a small incentive to generate improvements in their portfolio through active and costly efforts to improve governance and faced few meaningful regulatory incentives. 20 Banks, with large investments in firms through both equity and debt, failed in providing accountability by delaying bankruptcy proceedings. Their incentives for action were weakened by the extensive state role in bank ownership and control that created what some have described as a system of 'bank socialism.'
Intermediaries with inappropriate incentives were given free reign due to a lack of regulatory organizations. The securities and exchange commission had no real independent authority until the passage of the Securities Commission Act in April 1998.
Before then it was under the control of the finance ministry, opening it up to political pressure. Similarly, it was only in April 1998 that the Czech National Bank introduced more strict provisioning and loan classification rules to encourage banks to take their lending and monitoring roles more seriously. The timing of this legislation, following the downfall of a Czech government hints that behind this slow institutional development was a political unwillingness to cede discretionary authority to regulatory agencies.
The contrast with Poland, that took the different route of limiting voucher privatizations, and focusing first on the existence and incentives of organizations in the center of Table 1 , is striking. In Poland there was far more stringent initial regulation of securities, including the ability of the security regulator to control financial intermediaries through licensing, its much wider demand for disclosure by issuers of securities, and the Share issue privatizations are more likely to introduce firms without an initial controlling shareholder.
To a great extent, privatized firms around the world stick to established benchmarks. Among countries with relatively weak formal protections, there are very few countries that use share issues for a large proportion of privatizations. This pattern is closer to that of established firms than privatization in transition economies.
Performance when governance approach aligned with institutional environment
There are no comprehensive studies that relate outcomes to institutional factors and initial privatization approaches. Notable examples, such as the UK that adopted a formal governance chain approach and Mexico that adopted a private governance chain approach, show that both can work very effectively.
The UK introduced a governance approach where the average ownership stake of the largest shareholder was very low; for a sample of 25 electricity and water supply companies privatized in the United Kingdom ownership measured just 4.6 percent in the year of privatization. 22 Despite this low concentration that raises the possibility of managers controlling the firm, Dyck (1999a, 1999b) provide evidence that managers have been replaced, their replacement and compensation is sensitive to changes in firm financial performance, and privatized firms now find it easier to get top quality managers to work for these firms. These patterns make privatized firms in terms of incentives indistinguishable from established publicly-traded firms four years after privatization, and these patterns are distinct from the period of state ownership when there was no evidence of dismissal or compensation contingent upon firm performance.
Qualitative and quantitative evidence introduced in Cragg and Dyck (1999b) reveals the ability of these privatization programs to leverage the six links in the formal governance chain, with a particular importance of financial and information intermediaries. By year four, the extent of analyst oversight of privatized firms is indistinguishable from established publicly-traded firms, and the quality of this oversight exceeds that of privatized firms in samples of countries with both high and low levels of shareholder rights.
The Mexican privatization program, another notable success story, used private governance chains. Lopez de Silanes (1997) describes how controlling stakes were sold in 87 percent of firms in his privatization sample and when non-controlling stakes were sold, in 83 percent of the cases the shares were bought by the preexisting controlling shareholder. Returns to these privatizations have been tremendous. LaPorta and Lopezde-Silanes (1999) report a 40 percent increase in the ratio of net income to sales three years after privatization, much in excess of the 7.5 percent average Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborough (1994) report in their international sample of share issue privatizations.
Performance when governance approach not aligned with institutional environment
22 For further information on the companies included in this comparison see Cragg and Dyck (1999) .
What about those privatizations that followed approaches not aligned with legal protections? There is no systematic evidence available but some insight is offered from case studies from Latin America with a relatively longer experience with privatization.
Caution must be exercised in generalizing from these examples.
Consider the cases of the oil company YPF of Argentina, the largest company in the country, and Enersis, the single most important electricity company in Chile with controlling stakes in both the largest generating and distribution company. As reported in These ownership structures were notable because they were different than for the vast majority of other firms, in effect relying on formal governance chains to check abuse whereas the norm was to place more reliance on private governance chains. This approach opened up the possibility of abuse by management or a similar 'dash for control' and dilution of minorities as we saw in eastern Europe.
Most analysts give YPF high marks for consistently high levels of disclosure and responsible management, with both consistent dividends and healthy equity returns even through a takeover by the Spanish oil company Repsol in 1999. In contrast, while Enersis management is given strong marks for improving efficiency and performance, when
Endesa of Spain sought to buy a controlling stake in Enersis in 1997 evidence of widespread diversion emerged. Here, management was successfully able to demand a reported price 850 times that available to non-controlling shareholders.
23
23 Wright (2000) Thus, one conclusion is that governance approaches that deviate from that suggested by initial levels of legal protections can produce success, but they are vulnerable. Like eastern Europe, in these examples privatization through mechanisms that rely on formal governance chains provides a temporary benefit in increased market development and demand for governance institutions but these governance chains prove unsustainable. There is not sufficient institutional development to maintain these structures, with ownership concentration, delisting and in some cases like Enersis extensive diversion of returns.
Making a Given Governance Chain as Strong as Possible
To many advisors, the question they face is not what governance approach to take in privatization, but rather how to make the given approach as effective as possible.
There are many factors driving the choice of privatization method in addition to governance concerns. Political factors, including such issues as concerns about foreign domination or concentrating too much economic power in the hands of already powerful domestic groups, as was the case with YPF and Enersis, make it difficult to adopt private governance chains.
Making the most of formal governance chains
The discussion of formal governance chains suggests the importance of each link.
For firms that are privatized and left to rely on formal governance chains in countries that start with weak governance institutions, the natural response is to use the tools under control of the policy maker to compensate for those links beyond their control.
First, one can make up for weaknesses in domestic information disclosure laws by releasing more information, or better yet, tying the privatized firm to foreign institutions through cross listing. In addition to the benefits of increased liquidity and lower cost access for foreign investors, foreign listing requirements increase the extent of information, and the involvement of foreign stock exchanges and foreign regulators increases the credibility of that information. The presence of a foreign listing also helps to constrain the state by engaging powerful institutional investors which the government might be relying on in for future plans. The use of a foreign listing is likely to be particularly useful in providing information and accountability if the company's strategy calls for continued turning to international markets for financing.
The advantages of cross listings are apparently appreciated. Of the $133 billion that has been raised through ADS between 1990-1999, more than one third is accounted for by privatized companies. 24 There is an increasing fraction of equity in the transition economies also cross listed on foreign exchanges. Both YPF and Enersis pursued this strategy, listing both on their domestic exchanges and, as ADS, on the NYSE.
Second, privatization advisors can make up for weaknesses in the legal link of corporate laws by using company by-laws written at the time of privatization to transfer power to minorities and to raise obstacles to undermining this transfer. Many privatized companies around the world for example include a golden share that requires government approval for a control transfer. In an economy with well functioning governance institutions, this restriction imposes clear costs by limiting value-enhancing takeovers.
But in countries with weak governance institutions where control transfers can also lead to value destruction, such restrictions can protect minorities. In YPF, the company bylaws went further than a golden share and specified that if any entity assembled a 15 percent stake giving it control, they were required to make a public tender offer for all remaining shares with the same price to all shareholders (essentially introducing an 'equal-opportunity' rule). This protected minority investors in case the government ever relinquished this control. Enersis, lacking any such legal requirement, turned out to be more susceptible to diversion.
Third, privatization advisors should be interested in finding ways to coordinate the resources and powers of investors and other groups to uphold what legal protections exist, both through corporate laws and company by-laws. Enforcement of judgements ultimately requires political action and if there are no effective constraints on political actors, the impact of legally-based efforts will be minimal. Where groups can be enlisted, this will lead to greater enforcement and perhaps the development of stronger laws.
24 IMF (2000) , p. 73.
The case of Enersis demonstrates exactly this dynamic. A domestic investor when informed of this activity brought together other institutional investors and took action to protect his interests. Investors pursuing their interests generated information and spurred the securities regulator who required ENERSIS board to review the deal, which resulted in the firing of management and the imposition of a $55 million for failure to disclose information regarding the deal. Chile is now working on improving their takeover legislation.
Making the most of private governance chains
The framework also has implications if simpler private governance chains are used, for these approaches also have their governance dangers.
To reiterate, what is most important is to produce information and accountability by leveraging identity of owners and concentration of ownership, while limiting agency problems in controlling shareholders and/or the ordering agent.
The transition experience suggests that in countries with very weak formal governance mechanisms it matters to whom you sell firms. Some owners, due to their comparative advantages in access to information and other sources of hold-up power, are more able to hold insiders accountable and are more credible with outside investors in the absence of an effective state. Other owners independently have a reputation to uphold or are linked to an ordering agent who will penalize them if they engage in too much abusive behavior. Such a chain of logic provides one rationale for the relatively greater performance of foreign firms in transition economies.
The extreme version of the argument that identity matters in countries with weak formal governance chains is that in such settings auctions are problematic. What can develop is that the owner with the greatest ability and willingness to dilute will pay the most for the firm. This benefit of using identity however, needs to be compared with the equally daunting problem that without price as a metric, corruption is encouraged. Sequencing pre-qualification requirements then a competitive bid provides a way to get the benefits of identity and to limit the prospect of corruption.
Conclusions
Privatizations have produced significant improvements but also some disappointments. Advisors that take a governance perspective at the time of privatization will see more effective privatizations, particularly in the long run. At one level, taking a governance perspective is incredibly simple -the advisor needs to find a way to tie grabbing hands of public and private parties by providing information and accountability.
At another level it is difficult, for there are a variety of institutions that can provide information and accountability.
To simplify thinking about privatization and governance I have introduced the concept of governance chains to tie grabbing hands. I introduce two types of chains, the first being a private governance chain where there are few institutions and the institutions assume the responsibility of both providing information and accountability. The second governance chain I call formal, and the specialization of information and accountability increases the length of the chain.
Where each of the links is strong formal governance chains will be more effective, but as a matter of fact in most countries many of the links are weak. The key to effective privatization is to employ the governance chain that has the greatest probability of success in the first instance and, barring this, to strengthen each link as much as possible. Privatizations that attempt to use formal governance chains without initial development of the links of the governance chain, or concerted efforts to make up for existing weaknesses, will disappoint. 
